No one wishes for the bloodletting in Syria to continue except for ISIS and similar groups. But the other stakeholders in the Syrian tragedy are in need for an exit strategy from their predicament, and to avoid being dragged to a deeper quagmire, especially Russia and Iran. It will be the political process and its outcome that will determine whether the truce and the deal will collapse or not. If the axis of Russia, Iran, Assad use the temporary truce and deal to seek victory on the basis of victor and vanquished, then the Syrian crisis could last for a long time still and become Even more complicated. Other parties may want to benefit from a humanitarian truce to regroup, and therefore, it is the duty of the US and Russia to plan for contingencies.
Some say the truce's collapse Is inevitable because of the multiplicity of the agendas of the factions and their sponsors, and the difficulty of a diplomatic breakthrough as long as the situation on the battlefield does not allow it. thus there are calls to be modest about expectations and be more realistic. Richard Hass, head of the CFR, wrote in the Financial Times that the alternative is to change the facts on the ground by establishing safe zones and humanitarian zones with air cover and troops from the rebels and friendly neighboring countries. This line echoes previous Turkish ideas about safe zones, and no-fly zones.
Either way, the implication is that the prospect for ending the Syrian war is not plausible in the near future, according to Hass. Neither a nationwide ceasefire nor a transitional post-Assad government is in the cards, he adds, meaning that the best thing to be done now is to establish safe areas to reduce humanitarian suffering in Syria.
One of the key players in Syria's neighborhood is Turkey, which has entered the war for two goals, namely, ISIS and the Kurds. Ankara had no optiom but to welcome the deal, but that does not mean it will approve the designation to come of Syrian rebel forces as either terrorist or moderate. President Erdogan is intent to get the Kurdish factions designated as terrorists, challenging the US position that sees them as allies in the war with ISIS in Syria and Iraq, where the looming battle of Mosul is crucial. Turkey's allies in the rebel ranks are also not satisfied with the US-Russian designations and exemptions of the factions in Syria.
But do the Syrian factions have the power to do anything if realpolitik forces their backers to endorse the US-Russian terms? The answer lies with the leaders in the Gulf capitals concerned and the Turkish leadership, in light with what has been agreed upon and declared during the press conference last week of the saudi and Turkish foreign ministers: beginning with reiterating the call for Assad to step down and responding to rumors about Turkish willingness for him to remain during an open-ended transitional period, and not ending with the need to support Syrian Rebels especially n Aleppo. The military equation remains in the heart of the future of the truce, but there is little trust between local, regional, and international players, as well as between the Syrian opposition and the US administration.
In reality, the US-Russian deal effectively terminated the momentum for holding the Syrian regime accountable for the use of chemical weapons. Once again, Kerry and Lavrov exempt the regime from accountability. Indeed, the recent agreement protects the Syrian government from accountability, despite damning evidence by the UN inquiry against Damascus, in violation of international resolutions and even US-Russian agreements.
Most likely, the truce will remain in place, with the deliberate decision of Damascus, Tehran, and Moscow, meaning to ensure the UN meeting in New York proceeds positively, without Russian raids, regime barrel bombs, and Iranian militias being the center of attention, and without mention of the need to hold the regime accountable for its chemical attacks.
There is also a battle of perceptions and public opinion, and Damascus and its allies stand to lose if the public opinion turns against them because of the scenes of shivering children burned by outlawed weapons. Some concessions were thus necessary to buy time, but also for military calculations especially for Aleppo, where Iranian backed militias sustained heavy losses. As usual, John Kerry was ready to shake hands with Lavrov, who gave Kerry a carrot and kept many sticks in both their hands. Lavrov understands Kerry well and knows his weaknesses, whether towards Iran for personal and political reasons, or his hostility to the Syrian Rebels and their backers.
The moderate Syrian opposition seriously questions the intentions of and deals made by the Obama administration, and is not willing to fall in line by default. For one thing, this would mean signing its own death warrant. Indeed, the recent deal entails ordering Syrian Rebels to destroy one another, and threatens joint US-Russian operations to finish the mission in case any rebel factions fails to do so.
A permanent truce is imperative as is a grand deal to end the war in Syria, as part of the grand deals between the US and Russia and in the region, however, all of this appears unlikely to happen today.
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